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ABSTRACT 
 
Production governance is not detached from the effects it produces. This paper suggests a 
framework to assess coordination structures and mechanisms in terms of their ability to 
include the publics and their interests, and to generate socio-economic value consistently 
with those interests. To this end, the framework considers a combination of resource 
integration mechanisms (contract, authority, cooperation) and structures (markets, 
exclusive organisational structures, and inclusive organisational structures). These 
combinations are analysed along key features: information, knowledge sharing ad co-
creation, involvement and empowerment, as well as alongside some specific functions of 
governance (legitimacy, cognition, interdependence). The value added is in identifying 
criteria for appreciating diverse ways of integrating and coordinating resources, and the 
associated effects, thus providing both scholars and practitioners with a tool to 
discriminate amongst alternatives.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The underpinning idea of this work is that there is a relation between the features of production 
governance and the effects that governance produces. Such relation goes beyond the economic 
efficiency of the individual firm and can be extended to stakeholders and society more broadly. 
So far, literature on governance has analysed the impacts of governance on firm performance, 
mostly in terms of economic efficiency for the growth of shareholder value (Kappler and Love 
2004; Beiner et al. (2006); Black  et al. (2006);). However an integrated approach that considers 
broader effects, or effects on a variety of stakeholders and on society more broadly is missing. 
This paper builds on the concerns raised within business ethics and links governance features to 
their broader impacts (Blair, 1995; Sacconi, 1991; Sacchetti, 2015).   
Building on the strategic approach framed in Cowling and Sugden (1998), Zeitlin (1974), Hymer 
(1972), we consider governance as the set of rules that define access to interconnected layers of 
decision making. These layers are as a norm hierarchically structured.  The top layer is the one 
where strategic direction is defined. The intermediate level coordinates the strategies defined at 
the top of the hierarchy with the operational level, at the bottom of the hierarchy. Access to the 
different layers is defined by the level of strategic control. The central question in this approach 
to governance is who holds strategic control or, in other words, who decides about what is to be 
produced, how production is organised and how surplus is distributed. These issues are of 
relevance for a variety of groups who are not, despite their interests, involved in strategic control. 
The consequence of concentration of strategic control as against its wider impacts is the source, 
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in the approach, of strategic failure, or failure to include the interests of the excluded in 
production decisions that affect them and society (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009, 2010). Following 
Dewey (1927) we refer to excluded communities of interest as "publics."  
The reality of economic development is therefore characterised by inequality and uneven 
development (Hymer, 1972). The question, is how economic reality can move away from 
concentration of strategic control. This is clearly a governance issue, and a challenge to find 
different forms of coordinating production resources that recognise and include the multiple 
interests involved and the broader public interest. 
Broadly, governance literature has placed emphasis on aspects of cost minimisation, under 
assumptions of bounded rationality and asset specificity, or alternatively on the distribution of 
strategic control power. Literature has developed in the context of the modern corporation 
operating within neo-liberal market institutions, which rely on the existence of contracts, private 
property, and re-distributive role of the State. A common assumption on behaviour is that actors 
pursue their own self-interest, even at the detriment of others (Zeitlin, 1974). Approaches have 
placed emphasis, alternatively, on the ability of the governance model to a) reach internal 
efficiency (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1973), or b) to maximise strategic control over stakeholders, 
even to the detriment of the latter (cf Cowling and Sugden, 1998 for a critique), or c) to 
determine an effective cognitive framework to manage complexity (Loasby, 2006). 
These approaches can coexist in explaining aspects of production governance, and in evidencing 
the prevalent principles that underpin control structures and coordination tools. Still, in the 
study of governance, analysis tends to take one perspective, often focusing on internal efficiency 
to the benefit of one specific stakeholder (e.g. the stockholder). By focusing on internal efficiency, 
analysis explains forms of coordination that are useful to minimise ownership and contractual 
costs under different conditions defined by uncertainty, bounded rationality and the specificity of 
assets (Sacconi 1991 for analysis). The cost minimisation criterion, however, cannot explain 
forms of production governance that are inclusive of multiple interests and which can help a 
movement towards a reduction of exclusion and failure to address diverse societal needs, as 
denounced by strategic failure scholars. This happens because it is erroneously assumed that 
transactions with excluded stakeholders occur in competitive markets, thus ensuring optimal 
solutions for non-proprietors stakeholders. Instead, assuming the presence of market power, 
governance has been studied from the point of view of its institutional capacity to address the 
interests of stakeholders whose interests are not mediated by the market. These contributions 
analyse structures and rules that are able to balance a diversity of interests and powers, and to 
encompass multiple sets of motivations . Such are organisational models studied by cooperative 
governance scholars, such as Borzaga , and Tortia (2015); Borzaga et al.  (2014), Borzaga and 
Sacchetti (2015). A similar logic can be also applied to the study of the governance of networks 
and public, private and civil society partnerships, as in studies of collaborative governance where 
the search for "collaborative advantage" takes central stage, Cf. work by Hauxham (1993), 
Vangen and Huxham (2010) and Vangen et al (2014).   
With the framework suggested in this work, we assess coordination structures and mechanisms 
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in terms of their ability to include the publics and their interests, and to generate socio-economic 
value consistently with those interests. The value added is in identifying criteria for appreciating 
diverse ways of integrating and coordinating resources, and the associated effects, thus providing 
both scholars and practitioners with a tool to discriminate amongst alternatives. 
 
 
2. HOW DO WE STUDY GOVERNANCE? 
 
Sacchetti (2015) argues that governance is one of the key elements that differentiates the ethical 
dimension of production organisation, since it influences the distribution of resources and the 
nature of outcomes. The core function of governance is to coordinate the development of 
answers to an acknowledged problem. With this aim, formal and informal rules are functional to 
framing the modalities for accessing strategic control.  
The question for us, therefore, is how to appreciate the variety of governance structures in 
different situations, and their likely effects. In order to do so, the paper develops a framework for 
studying production governance models. Building on Borzaga et al. (2016), the purpose is to 
appreciate the specificities of alternative modes of allocating decision-making, starting from a 
fundamental distinction between the mechanisms (contracts, authority, cooperation) used to 
integrate resources, and the structures underpinning such tools (the market, exclusive 
hierarchies, inclusive structures). Specifically, the nature of production governance is 
appreciated by: 
 
A) the specificities of the integration mechanisms and structures, which define how control over 
the strategic direction of the firm is located (Williamson, 1973; Ostrom, 2005; Sacchetti 2013)  
 
B) the functions of structure, which identify the sources of legitimacy of each model, how actors' 
interdependencies are regulated, and how the cognitive framework within which decisions are 
taken is framed (Fulton et al, 2015),  
 
C) The effects of different governance forms in terms of moving towards greater inclusion of 
publics. 
 
3. COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
From the point of view of the efficiency of transactions, coordination amongst economic actors is 
aimed at allocating and distributing resources according to shared criteria, harmonising 
behaviours and make them consistent with the firm's goals, as well as fostering consistency of 
aims and decisions taken by managerial and organizational bodies. From a production efficiency 
point of view, coordination favours consistency in investment decisions especially when asset 
specificity is high, and when economies can be grasped from modularity, scale and scope, 
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information sharing and innovation (Williamson, 1973; Brusoni et al. 2001; Bruoni and Prencipe, 
2001; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1991). The complexity of production coordination depends on 
various elements, such as the nature of the resources available, the features of the value chain 
and of division of labour amongst organisations, strategic capabilities, size of the enterprise and 
the articulation of its governance, the nature and role of the stakeholders within the value chain, 
their access to information and power to influence strategic decisions and use of resources.  
Amongst the mechanisms used to coordinate and integrate resources, specifically we identify: 
contract, authority, and cooperation (Borzaga et al. 2016).  It should be noted that the three 
mechanisms are not exclusive (Figure 1). The same organization may use authority to organise 
internal transactions amongst organisational divisions when asset specificity and information 
asymmetry is high, and use contractual solutions to trade with some of its suppliers. It can at the 
same time engage with other stakeholders through cooperative relations, for example a worker 
cooperative would engage members through cooperative relations, use contracts with non-
strategic suppliers, and establish cooperative partnerships with more strategic suppliers, for 
example by investing in the development of joint assets. Cooperative relations can extend to 
competitors, for example in pursuit of a particular goal—e.g. the creation of a vocational school 
to improve localised learning and access to specific skills. The inclusion of more than one 
mechanism reflects the assumption of multiple situational contexts, but also multiple 
motivations and behavioural attitudes.  
 
 
3.1 Contract  
According to the principal-agent theory, the main goal of the contract is to align actors' objectives. 
Given the presence of power asymmetries, actors can be considered as principal and agent (Hill 
and Jones, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal delegates to the agent the supply of 
goods or services. The agent performs his tasks thanks to driven by incentives aimed at avoiding 
any free-riding behaviours. Both parties are in this case motivated by self-interest and they will 
try to get the maximum benefit from the exchange. The relation between the principal and the 
agent is specified by the contract. Typically, other extra-contractual dimensions of the relation 
are not considered. Under the assumption of independence and self-seeking behaviour, both 
actors might deceit each other and act against the other party's interests, even against 
contractual agreement. Since the relation is purely contractual, once the contract expires, the two 
actors have no obligation to continue the relationship. 
The more complete and accurate the contract, especially in including uncertain scenarios, the 
lower the chance of having ex-ante opportunism and ex-post litigation. Traditionally, economic 
theory forecasts that the larger the firm, the higher the ex-ante and ex-post contractual costs. 
However, according to the approach defined in this paper, contractual costs are related with the 
coordination mechanism in place and not necessary related with the firm's size, even if as size 
increases contractual costs are likely to grow.  
Contract is deemed to be a sufficient mechanism for interaction when incompleteness does not 
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place the weakest stakeholder under excessive risk of opportunistic turns from the other party 
(Hansmann, 1996), or when the substantive elements of the relation do not have marked 
immaterial characteristics (e.g. intrinsic motivation) (Cf. Borzaga and Sacchetti 2015; Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2015 amongst others). Contracts are consistent with market structures, where the 
exchange of equivalent goods is the basic interaction element, but also within hierarchies, where 
internal contracts regulate relationships between organisational units or between the employer 
and the employee. In all these circumstances, a certain degree of cooperation is required to abide 
with the contract and to manage unforeseen circumstances. Contractual relation remains the 
main coordination tool, however, and cooperation is deemed as "superficial" (Ertell, 1957; cited 
in Blackwood, 1977). According to Ertell (1954), superficial cooperation does not touch 
institutional individualities, identities or programs. Rather, as noted in Thompson (2015) it is 
based on contractual obligations or, in the case of market exchange, on an occasional sharing of 
resources. Superficial cooperation, as explained later in the paper, is consistent also with 
authority, which can feature also in contractual relations (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
 
3.2. Authority 
In the theory of the firm, authority is deemed necessary because actors' interests and goals are 
assumed to be unaligned, and authority is used to direct the agent's behaviour towards the 
principal’s expectations (albeit monitoring costs can be high when involvement in decision 
making is absent). Direction of one actor upon another is possible because authority implies that 
actor A agrees to act under the direction of B in a specific sphere, which is typically associated 
with ownership (Sacconi, 1991).  
This means that authority works within a structure based on uneven distribution of the strategic 
control function between A and B. However, as Sacconi (1991), Grandori (1997), and Cowling 
and Sugden (1998) suggest, authority is not necessarily related with ownership. Conversely, the 
consolidation of ownership does not need authority as the dominant coordination mechanism. 
Hence, more broadly, authority can be defined as the power to influence another actor's will, 
with or without ownership (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). For example, authority may be 
embedded also in contractual relations, as between employer-employee, when there is a power 
asymmetry between the contracting parties (ibid.). It is present also in cooperative organisations 
based on membership, in order to manage the cooperative agreement. 
 
 
3.3. Cooperation 
Ertell talks of "deep cooperation" as a more integrated level that happens at the grass roots of an 
organisation (Blackwood, 1977). We reinterpret this with Polanyi (1944) and presume that deep 
cooperation cannot occur across hierarchical levels, whether top-down or bottom-up, but mainly 
in symmetric structures, where actors occupy mutually dependent positions (Sacchetti and 
Sugden, 2003). In other words, deep cooperation is a level of cooperation that occurs where 
there is shared understanding on their role and actors rely on mutual expectations and trust, 
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beyond what contracts can specify and unlike authoritarian-subordinate relations. Attitudes 
towards deep cooperation are matched by expectations of reciprocity amongst peers, which is 
enabled by a governance structure where access to strategic control is shared equitably (Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2015). The relevance of cultural elements in explaining work-related values and why 
cooperation can prevail on authority have been explained in Hofstede's seminal work (Hofstede, 
1983).  
It should be noted that reciprocity differs from exchange in important ways. In fact, exchange 
asks for an equivalence (at least supposed or perceived by both parties) between the goods 
exchanged between actor A and actor B. Reciprocity follows a principle of equity and does not 
necessarily occur between two actors (say A, the giver and B, the receiver) but it could involve a 
third actor, C, who could receive from B as an act of reciprocity of B towards A (Polanyi, 1944). 
The most obvious cases of deep cooperation is when ownership and consumption, as in 
consumer cooperatives, or ownership and work coincide, as in small family-owned firms or in 
the case of worker cooperatives amongst workers. Deep cooperation can occur, to some extent, 
also when the firm is owned or managed "progressively" by the management, which adopts a 
human-centred approach to workers' relations (McGregor, 1960; Maslow, 1998), privileging 
participation, fairness, and workers' self-actualisation. Workers feel committed and, in some 
cases, they identify themselves with the firms' objective. As a consequence, evidence suggests 
that workers are more productive and industrial relations scarcely conflictual (Huselid, 1995). 
Cooperation, however, does not exclude the presence of authority or contracts in the same 
organisation. 
In networks, similarly, examples of deep cooperation come from the Marshallian industrial 
district. Here localised firms gain static and dynamic efficiency thanks to economies generated by 
spatial proximity, but also by institutional and relational proximity, which refer to shared norms 
and rules of behaviours, leading to relations based on reciprocity and trust.  Industrial district 
scholars have emphasised that institutional and relational proximity discourage opportunistic 
behaviour and facilitate the development of a "dense knit" of production interconnections 
(Camagni and Capello, 2002).  
Likewise, the work of Ostrom (1990) on the management of common pool resources has 
evidenced that deep cooperation is grounded on the ability of users and other institutional actors 
to communicate and preserve some degree of relational proximity, leading to the definition of 
shared, binding rules. Here, again, cooperation does not exclude the presence of authority, which 
is needed in order to monitor and enforce agreements. 
 
 
4. COORDINATION STRUCTURES 
So far we have addressed three different resource coordination mechanisms: contract, authority, 
and cooperation. To these integration tools correspond very different supporting structures: the 
market, exclusive hierarchies, inclusive structures (Figure 1) (Sacchetti, 2015; Sacchetti and 
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Tortia, 2015; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
 
Figure 1 - Coordination and control structures with prevailing resource integration 
mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
Market relations, typically contractual, have been justified in terms of the convergence between 
different but complementary goals, which are quantified by a price. Actors' choices are mainly 
driven by self-interest since interactions have not a long term temporary horizon. Moreover, 
industrial organisation has emphasised that when decision-making power and information are 
not equally shared, markets become unbalanced and stop allocating and distributing resources 
efficiently.   
In parallel, organised transactions have been presented as a solution to the costs of using market 
transactions. Hierarchical structures can take different forms. Here we are interested in 
discriminating them along the degree of access to strategic control. To this end, Sacchetti (2015) 
identifies exclusive and inclusive governance structures. In exclusive hierarchies, actors are 
connected through asymmetric power relationships, where the strategic decision-maker A 
exercises its authority over the directed agent B. The specificity is that the strategic decision-
makers' choices overtake all other interests. Typically, the owner's preferences and interests 
define the aims and drive the decision making process, albeit we could equally talk of top 
management's preferences. The crucial point here is that strategic direction power is 
concentrated, whether the controlling group is made of owners or managers. Therefore, failure to 
consider broader implications on those excluded from decision making can be considered as a 
consequence of an exclusive governance structure (Cowling and Sugden, 1998; Sacchetti 2015; 
Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003).  
Despite failures, the theory of the firm presents limitations in finding alternatives and moving 
away from exclusive hierarchies. The difficulty with the theory of the firm is that inclusion in 
strategic control is contemplated amongst peers with homogeneous interests, but not across the 
hierarchical line that connects stakeholders at different levels. Within a hierarchical structure, 
contracts can still regulate the relations among actors, especially between those with no property 
rights. But it is the authority principle that attributes the power to define strategic direction, that 
guarantees control and monitor transaction costs. Given the uneven nature of a layered 
command-and-control governance structure, reciprocity would have a marginal role, since - as 
Polanyi (1977) observed - it operates only amongst peers. Even within hierarchy, however, 
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voluntary cooperation may emerge amongst workers with a "jobholder" attitude as in Akelrof 
(1982) and Akelrof and Kranton (2005), or in terms of what Williamson (1985) calls 
"consummate cooperation,"  or the positive job attitude that elicitate effort towards initiative, 
judgement and actions towards unresolved gaps (Fehr and Gachter, 1998).  
Conversely, in a purely inclusive structure, all relevant stakeholders are involved in the decision 
making process. Stakeholders are engaged and actively participate in the firm's venture with or 
without property rights, but the responsibility about the sustainability of the firm is distributed 
among stakeholders and so are the statutory rights. This means that they are represented in the 
governance boards of the organisation and that managers are legitimised to pursue multiple 
interests rather than those of one stakeholder only. Reciprocity and cooperation are the main 
resource integration mechanisms, even though the use of a market or of authority (e.g. by the 
board), are not in contrast with this institutional setting.  The difference with respect to exclusive 
hierarchies is that here authority is justified alongside a pre-agreement amongst stakeholders 
that such authority will be used alongside equity and inclusive criteria. As in Sacconi (1991), 
stakeholders legitimise authority as long as results are distributed equitably and stakeholders' 
interests are represented when defining the firm's strategic direction. 
 
5. PROCEDURAL FEATURES 
 
We now ask what elements can enable an equitable distribution of results and representation of 
multiple interests. These can be tied to some critical stakeholder integration processes that 
differentiate coordination structures: information sharing and knowledge creation, stakeholder 
empowerment and involvement. Figure 2 below illustrates the framework and, concerning our 
question, it positions procedural features with respect to coordination structures (while their 
functions and effects will be the focus of Sections 7 and 8). 
 
 
 
 
MARKET
Contract
Authority
Cooperation
INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE
Contract
Authority
Cooperation
EXCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE
Contract
Authority
Cooperation
Procedural features: Knowledge creation and access to information, Involvement, 
Empowerment
Effects: interests of publics in terms of social and 
economic value , innovation
Functions: Legitimacy/control, cognition, interdependence
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5.1 Information and knowledge 
The issue of information sharing in governance has been debated by many authors in different 
fields. Information can be understood as the raw data being transferred from a stakeholder to the 
other or shared in the local environment. Differently from information, knowledge requires a 
cognitive process of sense-making and critical thinking. Knowledge formation is dynamic, and 
intensive in time and capital--i.e. social, human and physical capital. Thus information is 
potentially available to everyone in a certain context, e.g. in the form of production inputs. 
However, the capacity of selecting and collecting relevant information for a specific goal would 
need specific capacities on the recipient side.Moreover, the speed at which information circulates 
determines the efficiency of the knowledge accumulation process and creates gaps and divides 
among various groups of stakeholders, across geographical and social settings (Sacchetti, 2004).  
In his seminal work, M. Polanyi (1966) analysed the process of "knowing" through learning by 
doing and practicing. The personal nature of the way people learn has implications for the way in 
which knowledge can be transferred. In particular, Polanyi argued that personal knowledge can 
be transmitted through master-apprentice relationship or more generally through day-to-day 
work and relationships amongst actors. Part of our personal knowledge (also known as tacit 
knowledge), however, can be codified and, therefore, made independent from the inter-
subjective relation between two individuals. In industrial innovation literature, codified 
knowledge takes the form of blueprints, codes and rules that can be read, interpreted, and 
divulgated among people who can properly de-codify the text. In their seminal work, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) have applied Polanyi's analysis of knowledge creation and diffusion to the firm. 
With their knowledge spiral model, they suggest that, within the firm, codified knowledge 
represents "only the tip of the iceberg" and that most of the relevant knowledge is personal, hard 
to recognise and formalise  (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 3). They acknowledge that tacit and 
codified knowledge can interact, but only within an interpretative process that is essentially 
social.   
 
 
5.2 Stakeholder empowerment and involvement 
The second element that characterises governance is the empowerment of stakeholders. 
Empowerment research has flourished in community and organisational studies (Perkins and 
Zimmerman, 1995). Amongst the many definitions, there is a common element that tends to 
emphasise empowerment as a process that involves "mutual respect, critical reflection, caring, 
and group participation, through which people lacking an equal share of valued resources gain 
greater access to and control over those resources" (Cornell Empowerment Group, 1989). In 
their research on organisational empowerment, Gandz and Bird (1996) describe the 
empowerment of people as the “organizational revolution of the 1990s” (p. 383). However within 
organisations, empowerment has not always gone in the direction advocated by community 
scholars. In organisation studies, the most studied form of empowerment refers to workers, 
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albeit other forms of empowerment directed to different stakeholders exist, e.g. towards 
consumers or suppliers. In this context, empowerment tends to be approached as a strategy 
aimed at increasing the performance of the organization (Cf. Wilkinson, 1998). These outcomes 
can be generated in different ways. Gandz and Bird (1996) identify, different forms of 
empowerment: (i) role empowerment, related to the discretion of workers on their own work; 
(ii) reward empowerment, which refers to the quality of workers’ performance; (iii) process 
empowerment, that enables workers to affect the design of organizational process; (iv) 
governance empowerment, thanks to which workers participate and influence the direction of 
the organization. The first two relate to day-to-day tasks, the third to processes, and the fourth to 
strategic direction. 
Differently, involvement can be thought as a pre-condition of empowerment. Involvement can be 
limited to an advisory opinion without a sharing of the decision making power. In this case, the 
stakeholder might increase its reputation by participating, but without being empowered its 
decision-making role is not recognized. More commonly, however, one would expect that 
stakeholder involvement results in a process of empowerment. Albeit a degree of equilibrium 
between the involvement and empowerment levels is not always respected and this may 
generate conflict. Involvement can take different forms and feature diverse degrees of 
participation occur, like empowerment, at different levels. In general, it reflects the extent to 
which multiple interests and reciprocal interdependences enter in the definition of the four 
levels identified by Gandz and Bird. The strategic decision-making level ("governance 
empowerment") is the most relevant for our perspective. Our take on the desirability of 
involvement is different from contributions focusing on contingency elements of corporate 
governance. For example Aguilera et al. 2008 argue in favour of involvement only when firms 
reach the maturity stage. They suggest that at the initial stage, innovation and growth are the 
pivotal goals for enterprises. What matters is the firm's bottom line, which can require exclusive 
governance. Taking into account stakeholder’s voice becomes more important as the firm moves 
along its life-cycle, at a more mature phase, when involvement becomes functional to manage 
production relations along the value chain to reduce the need for control on subcontractors and 
younger firms (Aguilera et al., 2008). Differently, according to the approach used in this paper, 
the degree of stakeholder involvement is related to an explicit choice to share decision-making 
power and build relations on cooperation and reciprocity (specifically deep cooperation), and 
not to contingency elements (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009; Sacchetti, 2015). 
   
6. BRIDGING ANALITICAL ELEMENTS 
 
6.1 Knowledge 
6.1.1 Knowledge, contracts and the market 
The analysis of M. Polanyi (1966) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) suggests that when the 
prevailing coordination mechanism is contractual exchange, and the basic structure is the market, 
a large part of relevant knowledge cannot be accounted for, since through contracts knowledge 
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can only be treated if commodified, and identified via intellectual property rights. This system 
clearly captures only patentable knowledge, whilst leaving out the tacit knowledge that may 
sustain the entire production and innovation process. Property rights are in fact the expression 
of knowledge that can be codified and, because of the nature of knowledge, they are meant to be 
incomplete expression of what is known.  In markets, property rights are paired by contracts, 
whose function is to rely on existing information to describe possible scenarios aimed at solving 
the agency issue by virtue of a scheme of incentives and constraints that should induce actors to 
avoid opportunistic behaviours.  Lack of cooperation, especially, damages the circulation of 
information, as institutional scholars such as Heath (2001) and Brandom (1994) have 
highlighted. 
 
6.1.2Knowledge, authority and exclusive structures  
Consider now authority-based coordination within the exclusive governance structure. 
Information concerning strategies and operations is managed hierarchically according to a top-
down approach. In order to transmit information from the strategic centre of the firm to 
stakeholders, the main tools are light forms of social responsibility or reports used to comply 
with the regulatory requirements. In terms of production knowledge, likewise, the exclusive 
governance structure reflects principles of knowledge fragmentation, as in factory production. At 
the opposite extreme is the artisan system, whereby production knowledge is mastered 
holistically by the artisan. Critical economic approaches have analyzed the limitations of extreme 
specialisation and fragmentation, stressing, for example, phenomena of alienation and 
disconnection between the individual and its job task, which occur when production governance 
deprives workers of a comprehensive learning experience (Marglin 1974; Adaman and Devine 
2001; Screpanti, 2001; Sacchetti, 2004).  
 
6.1.3 Knowledge, cooperation and inclusive structures 
Socialisation of knowledge, as well as information sharing define the nature of deeply 
cooperative interactions. We typify knowledge socialisation as a feature of cooperative 
interactions especially within inclusive governance structures. Co-production of knowledge and a 
circular and constant exchange of information, necessitates relational and institutional proximity 
among stakeholders, thus reinforcing deep cooperation and feeding back to improve knowledge 
socialisation and the sharing of information. The nature of cooperative relations and knowledge 
sharing is circular, rather than merely horizontal. This happens thanks to the dialogic and 
participatory nature of decision-making processes, as well as by virtue of production 
organisation. On the one hand, the inclusive governance structure aims at creating decisional 
processes based on enquiry, which acknowledge and use diverse stakeholders' knowledge, as the 
one embedded in each and every stakeholder's experience (Sacchetti et al. 2009). The inclusive, 
dialogic process is aimed at promoting processes of creativity, learning, information 
interpretation and enquiry, (Dewey, 1927) as well as to motivate stakeholders (McGregor, 1960; 
Hirschman, 1982). On the other hand, in the inclusive structure, knowledge is socialised by 
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means of the production process itself, whereby individuals understand and can attach meaning 
to the entire production process. The co-creation and sharing of knowledge in the process of 
production is crucial, since it underpins the dialogic process at several levels, including where 
decisions regarding the direction of activities are taken (Sacchetti, 2004). 
 
6.2 Stakeholder involvement and empowerment 
6.2.1 Involvement, contracts and market 
Within the market structure, actors interact through arm-length relations. Involvement, as a 
process of co-determination of strategic production decision, is weak or not present (Sacchetti 
and Sugden, 2003). Stakeholders agree on a contract and they can act independently from each 
other within the remit of the contract specifications. They may exercise some degree of power in 
the negotiation phase, depending on the strength of the contractual position, before finalising the 
contract. However, once the contract is signed, the use of voice is very limited or not 
contemplated. In the impossibility to renegotiate the contract, defection is possible.  
 
6.2.2 Involvement, authority and exclusive governance 
With exclusive governance structures, coordination occurs by means of authority and command-
and-control mechanisms, whilst the power to define the firm's strategic direction is concentrated 
in the hands of a restricted group (Cowling and Sugden, 1998; Sacchetti, 2015). However, 
introducing stakeholder theory, Freeman and others have provided traditional firms with a 
justification for stakeholder engagement, even in the presence of exclusive governance (Freeman, 
1984). Stakeholder theory has synthesized why communication and conflict resolution between 
diverse and contrasting interests may lead to higher value creation for the firm, without however 
challenging the nature of corporate governance (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1998; Freeman et al. 
2007; Freeman et al. 2010).  
 
 
6.2.3 Involvement, cooperation and inclusive governance 
Differently, with inclusive governance the involvement of stakeholders is pivotal for achieving 
organisational aims. Actors are fundamentally interdependent, with respect to decision-making, 
knowledge, other resources and opportunities. In this case, coordination based on deep 
cooperation and reciprocity, as well as the modality of learning and knowledge creation 
engender a circular system of relations. The inclusion of multiple stakeholders and their interests 
is the rationale underpinning the governance structure, rather than a mean to the pursuit of 
exclusive interests. 
 
6.2.4 Stakeholder empowerment  
Considering the features of contractual involvement and involvement within exclusive 
hierarchies, we can conclude that "governance empowerment" is absent within a market 
structure, while it is marginal or not fundamental in exclusive governance structures. Within an 
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inclusive governance structure, on the contrary, each stakeholder has the power to co-determine 
the direction of the firm and share results. Differently from stakeholder theory, inclusive 
governance associates an active and strategic decision-making role to stakeholders.  
The processes (informing, knowing, involvement and empowerment) are coordinated by means 
of cooperation and reciprocity, which have the effect of enabling a more equal distribution of 
resources. While the involvement/empowerment category is fundamental, the other two are 
functional (implicit) in the empowerment feature. 
 
7. GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS 
We complete our comparison of coordination mechanisms and governance models with and 
analysis of governance functions. Fulton et al. (2015) take into account three functions of a 
governance system: legitimacy, cognition and interdependency. In their conceptualisation, 
interdependence describes the degree of cooperation and coordination that exists between and 
among individuals or groups; cognition refers to the amount of information that can be brought 
to bear on decision, legitimacy includes the degree to which people with power and authority are 
seen to be properly appointed.  
 
7.1 Legitimacy and coordination structures 
The source of legitimisation in markets is the ownership of some good, which is exchanged for a 
price according to each actor's best interest. This of course works as long as there are no 
asymmetries, which may not be the case. Theory suggests that conflicts are resolved either ex-
ante, before the contract is finalised, or ex-post through contract enforcement.  
Within the exclusive structure, legitimacy follows from the allocation of decision-making power, 
which coincide with the attribution of authority. In exclusive structures this authority is with a 
restricted group of decision makers at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. Its main function is one of 
exercising control. Because knowledge creation does not involve stakeholders, actors in power 
use an exclusive cognitive framework, which has the effect of restricting their horizon of 
possibilities and generate costs for the excluded (Sacchetti, 2015). 
On the contrary, the inclusive governance structure empowers stakeholders to partake in 
decision making. Through the process solutions gets legitimised by actors, although this 
procedure is not immune to conflicts. However, contentions are addressed through discussion 
and deliberative practice. The inclusive decision making process may imply higher costs of 
decision-making with respect to other governance systems, but it can be more effective in 
enhancing stakeholders' needs, in avoiding unwanted outcomes, and in reducing the costs of 
conflicts and opportunistic behaviours (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015). 
 
7.2 Cognition and coordination structures 
Cognition describes the capacity of decision makers to anticipate, to some extent, possible 
scenarios and to take the best steps given a certain level of uncertainty. The functions of 
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contracts include the anticipation of risks and possible situations. The goodness of a contract is 
partially related to its capacity to include the highest number of scenarios, albeit with the 
acknowledged problems of incompleteness and, therefore, costs attached to unanticipated 
sources of conflict. Uneven information and knowledge access, however, generate cognition 
unbalances and may limit the overall fairness of markets. In these cases, not dissimilarly from 
exclusive structures, authority may be exerted also through the market, by the actor who holds 
greater access to strategic resources (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
Exclusive coordination structures, on the other hand, are more static with respect to market 
solutions, they guarantee a less complex scenario, since it will be focused on the interests of the 
restricted group who is legitimised to determine strategic direction, at the cost of reduced 
involvement for others.  
On the contrary, in inclusive governance, the creation of a cognitive framework is achieved 
through the more complex process of deliberation. The amount of information to be processed is 
broad and heterogeneous given the inclusion of various stakeholders, their experience and needs.  
In this case, it is the deliberative process that empowers stakeholders to partake in knowledge 
creation. In particular, learning is based on shared experiences which are brought together to 
form a coherent cognitive framework through a deliberative process of enquiry and critical 
thinking (Dewey, 1927; Sacchetti, 2015). Those legitimised to lead the deliberation process 
should be able to interpret the needs and the frictions of stakeholders and adopt the adequate 
solutions. The identification of relevant positions is fundamental to define the core of the issue. In 
order to reduce the complexity of the decision process, sophisticated tools have to be developed 
for extracting the most strategic perspectives, consistently with the principles of reciprocity and 
cooperation (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015; Fairbairn et al 2015; Fulton et al. 2015).  
 
7.3 Interdependence and coordination structures 
The competitive market structure features basic interconnections but does not theorise 
interdependence. Connections are based on exchanges intermediated by prices and contracts. 
Interdependence is recognised only if tradable, otherwise it is not considered, as in the case of 
externalities.  
In the exclusive structure, interdependencies may be recognised, despite a biased cognitive 
framework, but will be considered only if they are functional to the interests of the governing 
group (Sacchetti, 2015).   
In the case of inclusive governance, interdependencies are explicitly recognised and integrated in 
the coordination model. The norms and nature of the relations among actors is thought to affect 
the capacity of the firm to acknowledge interdependencies and reduce failure in meeting the 
interests of multiple publics (Dewey, 1927; Sacchetti, 2015; Fulton et al. 2015; Borzaga and 
Sacchetti 2015).  
 
8.  DIFFERENT TYPES OF VALUE 
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The interest in discussing governance structures, coordination mechanisms, and functions aims 
at defining the dimensions of a framework that relates governance with the outcomes of the 
organization. In particular, we are suggesting that a governance model is assessed according to 
its effects on the relevant publics. As argued by Dewey (1927), the public includes those who are 
appreciably under the influence of an act. The wider the effects that the organisation's activities 
produce, the larger will be the groups of people which constitute its publics. In order to 
appreciate broad public impacts, a clarification on the idea of produced effects is needed. 
Organisations have objectives that are normally reflected in general terms in their mission 
statements. A mission can tell us something about desired aims, but less on the actual ends 
achieved. These can be accounted for by looking at outputs, outcomes and impacts beyond 
financial results, a practice that social accounting has developed as the rights of stakeholders to 
be informed gained importance (Gray, 2001).  
With respect to outcomes and impacts, accounting for outputs or, in other words, for the 
products and services, can be relatively easier. In fact, the bylaw is that organisations report on 
their outputs (Bagnoli and Megali, 2011). Outcomes require a diverse level of analysis of the 
effects produced by an organisation. They are - from the point of view taken in this paper - the 
result not only of desired aims, but the actual effects produced on specific publics, which are 
obtained through actions mediated by governance. In this sense, reinvestment in the community, 
innovation and client satisfaction, worker wellbeing can be considered as outcomes. Likewise, 
social relations, polluting emissions or labour exploitation can produce effects on specific 
categories of publics (namely neighbourhoods and workers). It would be misleading, however, to 
confine effects to those produced directly on publics. This is why impacts should be considered. 
Impacts are identified as broader effects on the context (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015). While, 
however, well-defined and quantifiable features can be easily accounted for, other aspects such 
as the quality of social capital and human capital can be more difficult to assess.  
Despite measurement difficulties, the point of relating governance with its effects is to be able to 
anticipate - to some extent - the effects produced based on the observation of governance 
features. It is, in a way a deductive approach, which we see as complementary to the 
measurement of effects.  
The coordination mechanism impacts on the capacity of an organization to use resources 
effectively and efficiently in pursuit of its overarching aims. First, when the prevailing 
mechanism of coordination is the contract, effects can be assessed by verifying compliance with 
contractual specifications and requirements. Achieving private goals is the pivotal object and the 
measure of success for the exchange. Typically, the publics and their interests, and likewise 
broader societal effects are not included in decision-making and consequently in the assessment. 
The number of actors involved in the same transaction is generally small and it almost 
correspond to the parties involved in the market exchange. Outputs and outcomes relate to the 
economic value produced, which is straightforward to evaluate. Outcomes do not account for 
parties who are external to the contract (publics), or for wider societal impact, assuming that the 
transaction involves exclusively two parties and the relation is one shot. Everything else is 
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treated as an externality. When the transaction occurs at arm-length, moreover, even the effects 
on the two parties are partially accounted for, since future implications of current arrangements 
may not be contemplated in the contract.  
Second, coordination by means of authority within an organisational hierarchy can provide a 
longer-term perspective. This may favour specific investments and outcomes such as product or 
process innovation, which would be difficult to achieve through contracts. Albeit the exclusive 
governance structure aims at favouring the objectives of a restricted group of people at the top of 
the hierarchy, the mission and actions taken are not private in a strict sense, since their effects 
(voluntary or involuntary) touch upon a large number of publics, such as shareholders in 
investor-owned firms, and on society more broadly (Sacchetti, 2015). As suggested by our 
framework, this is likely to generate societal failures. 
Intermediate governance solutions can be inspired by corporate responsibility, applied when 
organizations are interested in some degree of involvement, whilst retaining exclusive access to 
decision making and use of authority. As an example, consider the philanthropic organization of 
factories as in the experience of Olivetti (Molteni, 2006).  In such cases outcomes and impacts are 
intentionally generated by the decision-maker's ex-ante recognition of the needs of the weakest 
publics (e.g. workers and their families). 
Finally, in case of inclusive governance, coordination and structures embody awareness of the 
effects generated on specific publics and on society more broadly, taking into explicit account 
both outcomes and impacts (Sacchetti, 2015). If only outputs are taken into account, these firms 
may appear less efficient, due to assumed higher governance costs (Hansmann, 1996). By 
extending the evaluation of effects to outcomes and broader impacts, however, inclusive 
governance structure may be argued to be in a position to activate resources from participating 
publics and produce durable networks based on reciprocity and trust, as well as innovative 
outcomes. These solutions can be hypothesised to be closer to users' needs than those produced 
by other governance models. The argument is based on the advantages of adopting 
organsiational processes based on cooperation, which activate inclusion and empowerment, 
communication, knowledge and information sharing (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015).  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Governance is not neutral to an organisation's outcomes and wider impacts. The frame 
introduced here aims at understanding the complexity of governance structures and their mixed 
nature. With the aim to appreciate differences between and among different models, our 
framework highlights structures, mechanisms, processes and their underpinning functions. This 
can provide an important contribution to governance literature, by showing that it is possible to 
distinguish between multiple models. In addition the framework gives them simultaneous 
consideration, contrary to existing accounts where market and hierarchies have polarised 
scholarly attention. Second, we show how in each governance model it is possible to find a 
prevailing coordination mechanism. The other mechanisms are also present albeit in a marginal 
way. Third, the governance model reflects the level of involvement and empowerment of publics.  
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The general lesson is that a model should not be considered superior to another a priori. Each 
model is designed to respond to certain contextual conditions and needs. However, as Ostrom 
(1990) notices, the application of a model to a contextual situation that requires a different 
solution may provoke negative effects for publics and society. Market is more efficient when the 
publics reached by the effects of the transaction are limited and parties are not damaged by 
contract incompleteness. Hierarchy is necessary to manage resources by applying coordination 
rules (whether these are the result of cooperative decision-making or of authority). Inclusive 
governance is suitable when the service produced is complex and requires a high degree of 
legitimisation and knowledge input from publics, whose interests would otherwise be damaged 
by the risk associated with contract incompleteness or by the pursuit of exclusive interests 
(Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015). 
 
Albeit this work brings together a variety of themes, thus offering a comprehensive approach to 
governance, it does not cover applications. Further research in this direction can contribute to 
the construction of empirical support for the relations identified by the framework, between  
resource integration driving forces, their supporting governance structures and effects.  
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